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Abstract 
 This paper argues that while the framers of the new East African 
Community, cognizant of the problems of the defunct one, set out to create a 
new organization that would avoid the pitfalls of the old they were not bold 
enough to put in place legislation, institutions and processes that fully 
addressed them. Instead, they introduced bottlenecks that have impeded the 
realization of greater and faster cooperation through: 1) the creation of a 
complex and highly centralized decision-making process that is constrained 
by parochial issues of sovereignty and “zero-sum” national politics; and, 2) 
the reluctance by partner states to strengthen the Secretariat and other 
Community organs to respond to emerging issues. This notwithstanding, the 
Community is not yet in danger of collapse owing to important global and 
regional changes that make the environment for cooperation more conducive. 
However, if changes are not made, the community will stagnate. 
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Introduction 
 The collapse of the East African Community in 1977 did not end 
enthusiasm for cooperation in the region. Successive leaders of the three East 
African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, made efforts to revive it, 
which unfortunately did not bear fruits until 1984 when the Mediation 
Agreement resolved key longstanding disputes over the division of the assets 
of the defunct Community. More progress was made in 1991 when the 
leaders, meeting in Nairobi, agreed to “seriously” work towards the re-
establishment of formal cooperation. This was followed by the establishment 
of the Permanent Commission on Cooperation (the Permanent Tripartite 
Commission) in November 1993 and the Commission Secretariat.  This was 
in operation until July 2000 when the three countries signed the new EAC 
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Treaty setting their goals as the creation of a Federation of East African 
States, which was to be achieved in four stages: a Customs Union (2005-
2010)117, a Common Market (July 2010)118, a Monetary Union (2012)119 
and, eventually Political Federation120, whose date is not yet determined 
(Mugisa, Onyango, & Mugoya, 2009). The drafters of the Treaty were keen 
on addressing the problems that had contributed to the breakup of the earlier 
Community to ensure that the new one did not meet the same fate.  
 The collapse of the original EAC in 1977 was attributed to a number 
of social, political, economic and institutional factors. Kibua and Tostensen 
attribute it to three: inequitable distribution of costs and benefits, ideological 
differences, and, personality clashes (Kibua & Tostensen, 2005). Other 
factors associated with the collapse include: the centralization of 
administrative facilities in Kenya and the growing animosity between 
member states (McKay & Morrissey, 1998). Tanzania’s pursuit of national 
interest, which was threatened by Amin, whose coup in Uganda sabotaged 
Nyerere’s plans to isolate Kenya for the benefit of Tanzania (Lodompui, 
2009), inadequate compensation mechanisms in the region (Hazelwood, 
1975; UNECA , 2004), and imbalances in trade among the member states, 
which unfairly benefitted Kenya and its foreign owned industries (Robson, 
1998; Maasdorp, 1999).   
 To ensure that the new Community did not face similar problems as 
the old, a number of institutions were established to provide safeguards. The 
new Community established the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA) 
and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) that if provided the right 
authority and powers, can reduce the overconcentration of decision making 
powers within the executives of partner states. Although the Summit of 
Heads of State still possesses enormous decision making powers, such 
powers can easily be sharable with, and checked by, the Council of 
Ministers, the EALA or a strengthened Secretariat with executive 
administrative authority (Wanyande, 2005; Mwapachu, 2012), if the Treaty 
is amended. Furthermore, unlike the old EAC where the Summit was made 
up of only three heads of state, the new one has been expanded to include 
                                                          
117 A customs Union is essentially a joint administration of a Common External Tariff (CET) 
in an environment of zero internal tariff as well as elimination of all non-tariff barriers to 
cross-border trade among the Partner States.  
118 A common market calls for free movement of goods and services and other factors of 
production including labor. This involves the elimination of work permits as well as 
providing citizens from the region to establish businesses anywhere in the Community 
irrespective of their nationality.  
119 A monetary union, by creating a single currency area, dramatically cuts cross-border 
transaction costs. 
120 This would lead to the formation of a unitary government, including having one East 
African President. 
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Burundi and Rwanda. Southern Sudan and the Sudan are interested in joining 
as well.  
 The study examines two bottlenecks that continue to constrain 
integration within the EAC: 1) the creation of a complex and highly 
centralized decision-making process that is constrained by parochial issues 
of sovereignty and “zero-sum” national politics; and, 2) the reluctance by 
partner states to strengthen the Community Secretariat (and other 
Community organs) to adequately respond to emerging issues. The study 
argues that, serious as they are, the two bottlenecks are not likely to put the 
Community into immediate danger of collapse but will stagnate it. This is 
because of a number of important global and regional changes have taken 
place making the environment for cooperation in the region more conducive.   
 The study uses documentary evidence—both primary and 
secondary—including government and Community documents. The study is 
guided by a neo-functionalist approach to integration. Neo-functionalism 
views integration as a continuous process of widening the scope on the areas 
of cooperation amongst members. It divides the areas of cooperation into 
two: those that are of low politics (mainly the non-political and the non-
sensitive areas in economic and social sectors), and the high politics areas 
(areas that are sensitive such as issues dealing with sovereignty, immigration, 
identity cards or land).  
 Neo-functionalists present to main assumptions: One, it is easier and 
more encouraged to cooperate in areas of low politics than in areas of high 
politics; and, two, cooperation in non-political areas will have a spill over 
effects into other areas, even those of high politics. In other words, 
cooperation in economic and social areas will bring benefits to the members 
and will create friendships and good relationships that will entice them to 
want to cooperate in other more political areas. 
 The argument being made in the paper is that by concentrating 
decision making powers in the heads of state and governments and in other 
political units controlled by the member states, the EAC is driven more by 
issues of high politics and therefore hard to reach a consensus or establish 
common interests. Similarly, the paper argues that by not strengthening the 
Secretariat and providing it with executive administrative powers, it becomes 
hard for any disagreements among member states to be resolved since 
member states will be driven by domestic interests. The strengthening of the 
Secretariat enables it to pursue a “community interest” and to ensure that 
member states embrace it and align their domestic laws and policies to it.  
 
Decision-Making within the EAC 
One of the reasons for the failure of the defunct EAC was the 
overconcentration of decision making in the leadership of partner states. This 
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has not changed significantly. The same “parochial sovereignty” (Baregu, 
2005) that bedevilled the old Community underpins the new one. There is 
still an overconcentration of decision-making and implementation powers on 
partner states—on the Summit, the Council of Ministers and other 
bureaucrats, who answer to the Heads of State. Like was the case with the 
defunct Community, the majority of key decisions of the new Community 
requires the direct involvement of the Heads of State. The political class in 
each partner state is afraid of losing power and have been reluctant to amend 
the Treaty to give executive powers to the Community’s Secretariat or any of 
its organs. State bureaucrat are also reluctant to implement decisions of the 
Community.  
 Integration is essentially a political process that is both driven, and 
also seriously challenged, by political interests. While political support is 
necessary for the success of any integration mechanism, its lack spells doom 
for integration. No regional integration can succeed unless the political class 
is committed to fulfilling their obligations to the group as well as aligning 
their national policies to regional ones. That is, as a political process, 
integration is an outcome of bargaining among nation-state power brokers 
‘who bargain with one another to produce common policies’ (Sweet & 
Sandholtz, 1997). In this bargaining process, nation-state actors can either 
‘slow down’ the integration or push it in directions that are favourable to 
their interests.  
 Within East Africa, political interests (pulling towards national 
control) and economic interests (pulling towards more cooperation) have 
often collided. The pull towards national control is strengthened when there 
is a perception that the benefits and disadvantages of integration have not 
been equalized. This explains why the collapse of the old EAC was 
associated with unfair distribution of benefits (Mwase, 1979; Kibua & 
Tostensen, 2005). The desire to establish the new EAC did not eliminate 
politics from the new organization. On the contrary, the Treaty has several 
clauses that put national politics at the very heart of EAC integration and 
placed national politics in command of the EAC’s decision making process 
(Mwapachu, 2012). 
 The impact of national politics in community decisions is reflected in 
the Summit of Heads of State, the Council of Ministers and the various 
Sectoral Committees whose decisions are by consensus, where a veto by any 
partner state means non-implementation of the issue by the Community. It 
also means that the absence of a partner state is reason to postpone a meeting 
or decision on any issue. Article 11.6 and 11.8 of the Treaty provides the 
Summit (of leaders of the EAC) the power to make laws. The Council of 
Ministers (another arm of the executive) has the sole power to initiate and 
submit bills to the Assembly (EAC, 1999: Art 14.3(d); Art 14.5).  
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 The Council of Ministers—the policy organ of the Community—
approves Community regulations, even those implementing mere details, yet 
it only meets twice a year. Since the implementation of collective decisions 
for the Community is left to bureaucrats in partner states who are influenced 
by the prevailing national interests and partisan politics, the process is 
slowed down and tends to promote national policies at the expense of 
Community ones. Further, these national technocrats involved in Community 
decisions have a high turnover, which erodes the benefits of institutional 
memory for continuity (Mwapachu, 2012). These bureaucrats also have a 
busy national agenda that keeps them away from Community affairs for 
months. Since many of them are either the Attorney General or Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, among the busiest public servants in each country, they have 
limited time for community affairs. This, undoubtedly, delays Community 
matters for months and, at times, for years.  
 The Community’s Sectoral Councils, particularly the Legal and 
Judicial Affairs Council are also affected especially in states where the 
Minister for Justice is different from the Attorney General (who must also 
attend). In 2010 and part of 2011, for example, the Sectoral Council on Legal 
and Judicial Affairs did not meet, delaying the finalization of proposed 
amendments to the EAC Treaty (Mwapachu, 2012). The situation has 
become worse with the expansion of the EAC to five partners. Consensus by 
the five countries on every key issue is a laborious and cumbersome 
exercise. The EA Court of Justice has called for the Council to define 
consensus in a more flexible manner, through some form of qualified 
majority vote (Jacobs & Cordova, 2011). 
 In a case referred by the Council on whether consensus was needed 
on every issue or whether the principle of variable geometry could be used, 
the EAC Court of Justice determined that consensus does not necessitate 
unanimity of the partner states. This meant that no state ‘need have a veto 
power’ (Jacobs & Cordova, 2011). However, although the Council was 
required to come up with a more flexible view of consensus for the purpose 
of policy making, it has not yet done so, a factor that is sure to slow down 
the operations of the Common Market. This happened in the EU in 2001, 
when they signed the Treaty of Nice by introducing qualified majority vote 
(QMV) for decision making in the Council on the regulation of free 
movement of residence. The Lisbon Treaty expanded the QMV to budget 
matters (Jacobs & Cordova, 2011). 
 Other areas where integration has been slowed down by national 
politics include the finalization of the Customs Union Protocol that took 
three years due to the zero-sum positions held by the business community 
and private sector regarding certain products, the finalization of the Common 
Market Protocol which was held by Tanzania’s politics of land ownership 
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and use of national identity cards for cross border travel. Tanzania’s 
opposition to the two had to be accommodated for the protocol to be 
finalized. Despite, being new members, Rwanda and Burundi demanded for 
tangible national benefits for their cooperation. This forced the community to 
locate the EAC Science and Technology Commission in Kigali and the EAC 
Health Research Commission in Bujumbura. Thus, the signing of protocols 
and other EAC documents has been a cost benefit calculation by partner 
states at the national level. Further, bills in the EALA are moved by the 
Council of Ministers and when passed must be assented by the heads of state. 
In Council deliberations, national politics play an important part. The 
centrality of national politics in EAC decision making is further 
demonstrated by the Treaty’s position that decisions of the Summit and 
council of ministers are to be by consensus (EAC, 1999).  
 The powers conferred to the Summit and the Council vis-a-vis law 
making has the potential to undermine the role of EALA on the same. EALA 
is further weakened by the powers conferred to the head of state of member 
states who can withhold assent to any bill from the EALA. If any East 
African head of state does not assent such a bill a second time, it lapses. 
Indeed, Article 63 even gives the heads of state power to reject bills passed 
by the Assembly. Article 14.3 provides for the Council with legislative 
powers to issue regulations and directives that are binding on the partner 
states. EALA is therefore weak and has limited non-executive role. This 
provides the Summit in particular and the executive in general a veto over 
the EALA, which is not able to provide the necessary checks and balances 
over the executive. Furthermore, EALA members are not fully representative 
of the people of East Africa, and the way members are elected in each 
country does not produce truly representative members. EALA members are 
elected by national parliaments, a process that has not involved the people 
directly, which deprives them an opportunity to influence those that 
represent them at the regional level. 
 In addition, the new Community has established in each partner state 
a ministry directly responsible for East African affairs. This has however 
turned out to be more symbolic than a sign of dedicated commitment to 
Community affairs. These ministries, rather than running the affairs of the 
Community in their respective countries, have acquired the less significant 
function of "coordinating institutions” (Mwapachu, 2012). Despite their 
establishment, no significant delegation of authority was made to them by 
the partner states in decision making. They do not represent their states at the 
EAC level, a role undertaken by the Sectoral Council or Ministries whose 
decisions are taken to be those of the Council of Ministers. Since they do not 
have powers separate from those of the Council, their appointment did not 
reduce the backlog of work waiting the action of either the Council or the 
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heads of state. Indeed, one wonders what value such appointments added 
beyond the symbolic. For example, although they were appointed as part of 
the fast tracking of EAC integration, the finalization of the EAC 
Development Strategy (2006-2010) delayed way beyond agreed timelines 
(Mwapachu, 2012). The launching of a common passport and tourism visa 
for the region had also delayed until it came into effect in January 2014 and 
even this was done by leaving behind Tanzania and Burundi. If they had had 
clear mandate they could have helped in speeding up Community decisions.  
 The regulatory system in the EAC is also ‘top heavy’ in both 
decisions authority and expertise, funnelling regulatory decisions upwards 
into the political institutions dominated by the national ministries. This top 
down control by the partner states at every stage of policy development 
poses a threat to closer cooperation in that Community voice lacks or is 
suppressed by nationalistic elements. The horizontal expansion of the 
Community (by the inclusion of Rwanda and Burundi) and the vertical 
expansion of its workload under the Customs Union and the Common 
Market have challenged it further making such a highly centralized decision-
making mechanism untenable. This, according to Juma Mwapachu, the 
Community’s third Secretary General, can be resolved by granting the 
Secretariat and the Council of Ministers more executive authority over 
administrative matters (Mwapachu, 2012). 
 Many of these political problems were identified as early as 2004 
when the Committee on Fast Tracking East African Federation was tasked to 
examine ways and means to expedite and compress the process of integration 
(EAC, 2004). The Committee, popularly known as the Wako Committee, 
submitted its Report on November 26, 2004. The Report pointed to the fear 
of erosion of sovereignty among the political elite as a major threat to the 
EAC Federation and identified several political/governance and institutional 
hurdles to integration. These included: the absence of a politically 
accountable authority at the regional level, the lack of executive authority 
within the Secretariat and other organs of the Community that was 
undermining the abilities of the Secretariat to discharge its mandate, attempts 
by government ministries of partner states to micro-manage the Secretariat, 
failure to properly define the roles of key organs of the Community such as 
the EA Court of Justice and EA Legislative Assembly (EALA), and, the 
failure to accord them functional independence  (EAC, 2004). 
 The overconcentration of powers in the partner states has affected the 
Community in other significant ways. For example, there has been reluctance 
among partner states in the domestication of the EAC Common Market 
protocol. By 2011 only Kenya had started the process with the publication of 
the miscellaneous amendment Bill 2011 which sought to amend laws that 
impinge on the Common Market protocol (Mwapachu, 2012). Other partner 
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states have just started the process. Worse still, the ratification of protocols 
even when they have been approved by the Summit of partner states is 
delayed.  
 Thus, while on paper, power seems to have been decentralized from 
the Summit to the Council of Ministers, and variable geometry mechanisms 
put in place in which countries that are ready to sign or implement an aspect 
of the protocol can do so as they wait for other members, the new EAC is 
still based on the same foundation stones of its collapsed predecessor. As 
Baregu contends, the new Community Treaty is underpinned by the same 
“parochial sovereignty” that had underpinned the old one and the same 
assumption that a common market can function in the absence of a common 
political authority. That is, a federation cannot be established unless the 
leaders involved resolve the question of how to share or “pool” sovereignty 
(Baregu, 2005) a lesson that the new Community does not appear to have 
learnt from the past (Ajulu, 2005). While the leaders talk much about fast-
tracking the federation, they are simultaneously pursuing conflicting political 
agendas in their respective countries  (Nabudere, 2005) yet are not ready to 
“confront the sensitive issue” of shared sovereignty (Ajulu, 2005). 
 Further the new Community is based on the same gradualist approach 
predicated on a step-wise movement from a Customs Union through a 
Common Market and ultimately to political federation, which the leaders of 
the region are unwilling to change. Despite the leaders agreeing to “fast 
track” the federation, they lack the political will to effect the necessary 
changes to achieve it. The leaders, for example, announced the formation of 
the Common Market before the three countries changed their laws allowing 
for the free movement of people across the region and hence the EAC 
Common Market does not guarantee people free movement across the 
Community. In addition, despite the formation of the Common Market, the 
region’s laws have not been harmonized to facilitate the free movement of 
persons, goods and services. Beyond the harmonization of laws, governance 
systems and structures have not been harmonized, while the necessary 
administrative and legal reforms required in the facilitation of intra-
community mobility of labour and services possible are yet to be undertaken.   
 
Reluctance to Strengthen the Secretariat 
 The overconcentration of decision-making powers on the Summit and 
on the Council has resulted in a reduced role of the Secretariat and that of 
other organs of the Community and created a lengthy and slow process of 
approval. The process goes through the Sectoral Committees, the Council of 
Ministers, the Summit and to the partner states. In each of these steps, 
approval of both decisions and protocols is by consensus, failure to which it 
is blocked. This has resulted in many sessions experiencing serious quorum 
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problems, leading to the postponement of meetings, yet they are hard to 
reschedule and delays in the finalization of Community protocols and 
projects.  This has also led to delays in the finalization of community 
projects. 
 Although the Secretariat is the executive organ of the EAC 
responsible for the operations of the Community in reality it doesn’t 
executive policy, and holds none of the real authorities or powers of the 
EAC. Rather than offering direction for national bureaucrats, the Secretariat 
has become a forum where technocrats from partner states negotiate to 
harmonize their national positions and interests. There is also no legal 
mandate for consultation in the EAC institution or any systematic method 
used to consult during policy making, which has remained unorganized, ad 
hoc  (Mwapachu, 2012). The Secretariat is therefore unable to facilitate 
national bureaucrats adapt national positions to regional standards. As 
Mwapachu points out, the EAC Secretariat operates, not as an executive 
decision-making organ but largely as an agency for generating thinking 
ideas, projects and programs for consideration by partner states, which he 
considers a ‘serious’ drawback to the functioning of the Community 
(Mwapachu, 2012). The Summit needs to seriously move towards granting 
the Secretariat and the Council of Ministers more authority over 
administrative matters. Increasing the authority of the Secretariat and the 
Secretary General to make routine decisions is long overdue. Once this 
happens, the Council can delegate many of their routine decisions that have 
backlogged the community. 
 Partner states’ failure to cede more authority to the Secretariat or 
adjust the strict quorum requirements has caused quorum problems in both 
Sectoral and Council meetings. Partner states have failed to appreciate the 
extent to which the EAC Secretariat has developed greater internal capacity 
and competencies to discharge more responsibilities (Mwapachu, 2012). 
Further, the Secretariat in its present form is unable to carry out the essential 
market functions required by the Common Market. There seems to be an 
unfounded fear among heads of partner states that a strong Secretariat or a 
strong Secretary General might usurp the powers of the partner states 
(Mwapachu, 2012). Thus, even though the responsibility of the Secretariat 
has expanded over time, there has not been a corresponding expansion of its 
authority or professional cadre of staff, which has overstretched the abilities 
of the secretariat to the point of inefficient service (EAC, 2004). Despite the 
Wako Report recommending that the Secretariat be granted executive 
powers to enable it act with authority on behalf of the Partner states on 
Community administrative matters, the political class has resisted it. The 
reluctance to cede national sovereignty to the EAC Secretariat leaves it 
without the supranational authority required to enforce community decisions. 
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This explains why there has been a persistent problem of non-harmonization 
of positions on Community protocols and other international obligations 
(Mwapachu, 2012). 
 The political class’ fear of a strong Secretariat has been extended to 
the budgeting process. As the Wako Report further pointed out, the authority 
of the Secretariat in Community budgeting is being usurped by partner 
states’ national technocrats. Contrary to Articles 132 and 133 of the Treaty 
mandating the Community Secretariat to initiate budget on the basis of 
agreed Community programs and projects for the partner states support, in 
practice technocrats from partner states formulate the budgets on the basis of 
ministerial ceilings in the national budgets (EAC, 2004). Member States 
have often not remitted in time their approved contributions to the 
Secretariat, which delays the implementation of Community projects and 
programs. Some countries are even in arrears (EAC, 2004). 
 This fear has been extended to other EAC organs. With the exception 
of the EA Court of Justice, which has some limited powers, no organ of the 
Community has supra-national authority (Jacobs & Cordova, 2011). Actions 
of these organs, including the EALA and the EAC Secretariat must be 
approved or adopted by partner states. Further, the major organs and 
institutions of the EAC have neither been harmonized nor coordinated and 
their regulatory framework not unified. Each works towards fulfilling their 
statutory functions and their cooperation. Sectoral Committees lack a shared 
perspective on the Community agenda, do not operate with any established 
procedures, transparency and their technical experts are either highly 
variable or unavailable (Mwapachu, 2012). The Community is also static on 
issues concerning important changes needed to the organs of the 
Community. Further, regional regulation is being developed through slow 
negotiated and inefficient harmonization efforts (Jacobs & Cordova, 2011). 
 The Treaty has no provisions that give executive powers to the EAC 
and its organs and as a result it is almost impossible for any of them to 
effectively implement the decisions of EAC. EAC organs and institutions are 
not well coordinated and the regulatory framework is not unified (Jacobs and 
Cordova, 2011: 2). The Report to fast track the EAC recommended that the 
EAC secretariat should be granted executive powers to enable it act with 
authority on behalf of the partner states on community administrative 
matters.  
 Frustrated with the forgoing, a situation has developed since 2013, in 
which those countries wishing to move fast on an issue or fast track their 
implementation of specific Community protocols have formed what has 
come to be known as the ‘coalition of the willing’ (Ramah, 2014) to 
implement Community decisions without waiting for a consensus with the 
rest. This has led to the exclusion of Tanzania and Burundi from certain 
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integration programs (ostensibly for dragging their feet). A number of 
meetings of the “willing” have taken place and programs launched which 
have excluded the two. For example, in August 2013, two meetings were 
held in Uganda and Kenya and a third in Kigali in October to deal with 
issues of security and immigration aimed at easing movement of citizens and 
tourist to boost cross-border trade. The three partners, Kenya Uganda and 
Rwanda again met in Kigali in January of 2014.  
 Contrary to Article 7 of the Treaty, the coalition of the willing did not 
notify Tanzania and Burundi, as demanded by the EAC Treaty. This was also 
not the case when Kenya, Uganda and Rwanda adopted the single visa for 
tourists and citizens among three countries in November 2013. Although the 
Heads of Government of the three countries pointed out that they did not 
lock out other members, who could join when they are ready, such a move 
has the potential to cause unnecessary rift within the Community since it 
might be a pointer to serious divergence in economic and political 
orientations (Goldstein & Ndung’u, 2001). 
 This emerging trilateral dealings and the apparent isolation of 
Burundi and Tanzania are the latest threats to regional integration. Though it 
might propel integration forward fast, such a move has the potential to sow 
seeds of suspicion, divisions and discord or re-introduce barriers to trade that 
might re-ignite mistrust, divisions and the same discord among the summit 
members which might lead to similar ends as was with the defunct 
community. There are still thorny issues that have not been resolved 
particularly on land ownership, political federation and citizenship.  
 
Is the Collapse of the EAC Inevitable? 
 From the above one may want to ask whether the collapse of the new 
East African Community is inevitable. The answer to this question is a 
resounding NO. There are important changes that have taken place globally 
and in the region that make the environment for cooperation more conducive. 
By the time the new East African Community was established, numerous 
changes had taken place in the region and globally, that have had a positive 
impact on integration and that changed the region’s leaders’ thinking about 
regionalism.  
 At the global level, the end of the cold war, the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the spread of neo-liberal ideas and globalization have drastically 
reduced the ideological polarization that had poisoned relations among the 
East African leaders. This has made cooperation more appealing than it had 
been during the era of the defunct EAC. Globalization has generally forced 
states into joining different regional organizations, while states have 
strengthened the already established organizations in the hope of overcoming 
the negative effects of globalization.  
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 First, the post-cold war globalized international system remains a 
neo-liberal system, in which neo-liberal economic discourses predominate. 
Under a neo-liberal system, the role of the state is reduced to one of 
providing the “enabling environment” for the market. Under this system the 
role and goal of integration is to consolidate and integrate existing free trade 
areas and use them as a stepping stone towards the construction of a regional 
economy (Söderbaum, 2002). It is the de-emphasis on sovereignty and state 
security in favour of a more people centred regional economic organization 
that is responsible for the success of integration.  
 Second, globalization has led to the resurgence of interest in regional 
integration especially in the Third World, in which existing integration 
mechanisms have been reforecast and strengthened while new ones have 
been created. Under globalization the objectives and processes of existing 
regional economic communities have been redefined. In line with the 
democratization process experienced in the continent in the post-cold war 
period, regional economic organizations in the post 1990 period have 
become increasingly more people centred and representative. Many of the 
new or restructured regional integration mechanisms have established a 
Community Parliament. Efforts are also being made to establish and promote 
a strong regional civil society “so as to involve the people in regional 
decision making” (Mittelman, 1998). In addition, the reconstituted 
organizations have also included a number of social charters as part of the 
integration mechanism to provide legal, social and political rights to their 
citizens which are enforceable by the organizations’ courts (Quashigah, 
1997). Indeed, community courts no longer just interpret the provisions of 
the treaty and settle disputes between partner states (Iheduru, 2003) but are 
empowered to enforce community decisions and protect peoples’ rights as 
well.  
 Third, in the post-cold war period, the process and the objectives of 
regional integration have been redefined and has led to the mushrooming of 
numerous non-state actors (Iheduru, 2003) that have emerged to make claims 
to the political space being opened up (Grant & Söderbaum, 2003; Cerny, 
1998). This coexistence of formal and non-formal actors or state and non-
state actors has changed the traditional state-centric notion of regionalism 
into one that is people centred, or “regionalism from below” (Iheduru, 2003). 
 Similar changes have taken place in the East Africa region making 
regionalism more appealing. Rok Ajulu has identified four such changes. 
First, the end of the cold war provided an ‘enabling environment’ in the 
region for cooperation. Second, the differences and ideological polarization 
experienced during the cold war have been replaced by an ideology of 
convergence (Ajulu, 2005). As a result, the ideological comradeship between 
Nyerere and Obote driven by the Arusha Declaration and Obote’s Move to 
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the Left and a desire to isolate Kenya has since been forgotten. The leaders 
of the other East Africa countries have embraced capitalism and their 
economic policies are not different from Kenya’s. Third, the end of the 
single party and the introduction of multiparty politics in the region did 
introduce a degree of political convergence as well. Finally, Ajulu points to 
the widespread conversion of neoliberal (free market) economic policies in 
the partner states, which have ensured greater harmony both economically 
and politically. These changes provided the environment and the political 
space where new initiatives are possible (Ajulu, 2005). 
 To Kapstein (2010), the EAC region has changed in three important 
dimensions, which has changed the political and economic circumstances of 
integration. These include: the relative size of partner states, the regime types 
and the economic structures of members, each of which had been identified 
as a contributing factor to the collapse of the old Community (Kapstein, 
2010). Kapstein argues that in the post 1990 period, both Uganda and 
Tanzania have grown in comparison with Kenya, that the two countries have 
not only narrowed the gap between them and Kenya but have given them 
confidence that they can mutually trade with her. Secondly, that the three 
countries have moved so close to each other politically that the ideological 
polarization of the 1970s has all been overcome. Finally, Kapstein argues 
that changes in the economic structures of the three EA countries, coupled 
with the growing middle class with its sophisticated lifestyles and product 
demands have increased the benefits of trade. To him, these three reasons 
offer promises of gain that the partner states would not want to lose and 
therefore favour integration.  
 Finally, the design of the new EAC offers more promise for its 
survival. Unlike in the old Community that was driven by the executive, the 
new one is supposed to be people centred and civil society driven. In line 
with the proliferation of CSOs in the region, the framers of the new EAC 
adopted rules aimed at enhancing civil society participation. In the treaty 
making process, for example, the leaders recognized the need for the new 
Community to not only involve the civil society but to ensure that the 
Community was people centred. Partner states agreed to “provide an 
enabling environment for the private sector and the civil society to take full 
advantage of the community”, to “formulate a strategy for the development 
of the private sector” and to dialogue with the private sector and the civil 
society (EAC, 1999: Art. 127). However, although the involvement of the 
citizens in the affairs of the EAC has also been wanting, a number of civil 
society organizations and business community have taken a keen interest in 
the affairs of the EAC and are reaping its benefits giving then a stake in its 
survival. Thus, even though the citizens of East Africa region have not been 
directly involved in the affairs of the Community, a number of civil society 
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and business community have taken interest in the Community affairs to a 
level that cushion it against the possibility of simple disagreements 
degenerating into threats to the community. 
 
Conclusion 
Without a dispute, the new EAC has consolidated and extended gains 
for the people of the region. It has structures and institutions that have gone a 
long way to further the process of integration while at the same time making 
it more stable than the defunct EAC. However, a number of lessons seem not 
to have been learnt; overconcentration of decision-making powers on the 
Summit and on the Council still continue; there still is a weak secretariat 
with no real executive mandate; slow decision making; and decisions that are 
determined by a one-state veto. Even though these problems are a cause for 
worry in the integration process, they do not cause an immediate threat to the 
stability of the EAC. This is because, in an age of globalization, there has 
been de-emphasis on sovereignty and state security in favour of a more 
people centred regional economic organization. In addition, there is a 
resurgence of interest in regional integration especially in the Third World. 
Existing integration mechanisms have been reforecast and strengthened 
while new ones have been created. These combined with a more involved 
civil society have made the new EAC more stable and not susceptible to 
collapse as the defunct one. The above notwithstanding, if left unchecked, 
these lessons not learnt may in time stall or even reverse the gains that have 
been made through the EAC. Clearly, the political elite have a much bigger 
role to play in a successful integration process. They must own the process 
and seize the opportunities to optimize integration. 
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